Remember all those wonderful Douglas Aircraft planes that used to fly around the world? The DC-3 “Goonie Bird” from World War II: 607 of the civilian version were built, and if you consider the Russian and other knock-offs, over 16,000 of the military version were built. The DC-3 was followed by the DC-4, the DC-6, DC-7, and the DC-8, Douglas’s first passenger jet and a competitor to the Boeing 707. Finally, the DC-9 and DC-10, later produced as the MD-80 and MD-11. Some Douglas planes are still flying today; Douglas Aircraft is not. What happened to the Douglas company? The answer is partly in the designation MD-80: “MD” stands for “McDonnell Douglas.” In 1967, Douglas merged with McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, which made fighter planes like the F-4 Phantom, used extensively in Vietnam. And where is McDonnell Douglas these days? In 1997 McDonnell Douglas was merged into Boeing. Then there’s Lockheed. They made the beautiful Constellation, one of which was chosen to fly as the first Air Force One for President Eisenhower. Lockheed later made passenger jets and turboprops, too, like the Electra and the 3-engine L-1011. What happened to Lockheed? They’re still out there as part of Lockheed Martin, and they build transports for the Air Force. But they left the commercial transport business years ago.
There’s where we start to see what might be a major problem – and it’s not only the airlines that are affected.
If you look at the current state of the aerospace industry versus its history, many of the former independent airframe manufacturers have disappeared, swallowed up in merger after merger. Some of them still exist, but usually as part of a larger organization. The immediate post-WW II period was a golden age for aviation as airframe manufacturers experimented with new technologies like jet engines and swept wings. But by the late 1960s, most of that experimentation had led to settled designs that exist today, and focus shifted to refining those designs. When government funds for developing new aircraft dwindled, manufacturers merged with each other to survive. And when the Cold War ended and money for military hardware really dried up, the scramble for survival severely reduced the number of competitors, with only the largest able to compete in one way or another. And therein lies the problem: it’s HOW those huge companies compete that raises questions – and eyebrows.
Consider:
– Boeing found it very easy to convince the U.S government that Bombardier was undercutting it and to place a 300 percent tariff on Bombardier planes sold in America. They’re still complaining, even though Bombardier has been bought out by Airbus and will build planes in Alabama.
– Boeing tried to convince Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer to join with it in producing planes competitive with Bombardier, going so far as to promise “military business” (no doubt American) if the Brazilians cooperated.
– Google “Boeing military aircraft,” and you’ll see a list of aircraft originally designed and built by other companies but now built by Boeing. They include the V-22 Osprey, the F/A-18, and others. Other companies now voluntarily team with Boeing to use its influence in selling new projects to the Pentagon.
– In a competition to replace the Air Force’s aging KC-135 aerial refueling fleet, the Air Force first chose an Airbus design. Boeing protested; the competition was reopened, and the contract was instead awarded to Boeing.
– For years Boeing convinced the FAA that they would police themselves in designing and producing aircraft. Two major crashes of the 737 MAX due to faulty software and hardware raise doubts about that practice.
– Reports recently coming from Boeing’s Charleston plant reveal major concerns among employees that unrealistic management expectations have led to unsafe practices and questionable quality in finished aircraft.
– Just this past week, the FAA finally issued an airworthiness directive legally mandating modifications to the 787 that for years Boeing only “recommended.”
– The Boeing/Airbus lock on large commercial transports has been described as a worldwide “duopoly.” Airlines wishing to choose an American plane have nowhere else to turn.
How big is “too big”? When does size equate to too much power and influence? Maybe it’s time to start thinking about it.